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Abstract  
The benefits and challenges of the Internet of Things (IoT) are increasingly capturing the 
attention of policy-makers, the media and the wider public. On the one hand, IoT has the 
potential to enable new models of organising social and economic activity, as evidenced in 
sectors such as transport (mobility as service) and manufacturing (industrial IoT). On the other 
hand, IoT is challenged by the increasing number of cyberattacks originating from unsecure 
connected devices and the challenges of monitoring and enforcing basic security policies on 
them. This paper analyses the unique cybersecurity risks emerging from the growth of IoT, 
focusing on the use of connected devices as vectors in distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks. Through an analysis of the Mirai DDoS, the paper identifies three unique characteristics 
of IoT botnets: a) higher utilisation rate; b) more durable infections; c) greater contamination 
rate due to their increasingly connected ecosystem. The paper concludes that an adaptive 
governance structure is required to effectively respond to the dynamic cybersecurity risks 
associated with IoT and its potential to develop into a global infrastructure of vulnerabilities. 
This complex adaptive system cannot be based solely on traditional points of authority (e.g. 
regulation; formal standards) and relies on the information gathering and monitoring 
capabilities of transnational internet anti-abuse communities, such as M3AAWG and APWG, 
to provide a more modular response to the global proliferation of IoT products with low level 
of security.    
Keywords: IoT, cybersecurity, adaptive governance, global private governance  
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Introduction  
The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly capturing the attention of policy-makers, 
businesses, the media and the wider public. Currently, IoT is defined as:  
“an infrastructure of interconnected objects, people, systems and information resources 
together with intelligent services to allow them to process information of the physical 
and the virtual world and react” (ISO/IEC JTC 1, Working Definition). 
In itself, adding communication and sensing capabilities to physical objects is not new, dating 
back to the late 1990s when products and industrial parts become equipped with radio frequency 
identification tags (RFIDs) in sectors such as commerce, transport and logistics (IEEE Internet 
Initiative, 2015; Xu et al., 2014; Brown 2015).  
However, in recent years, IoT has proliferated across a wide range of business-to-consumer 
(e.g. fitness tracking, home security, energy metering) and business-to-business sectors (e.g. 
monitoring machinery, managing inventory, data analytics). Gartner, the digital market 
research and analysis company, forecast that “8.4 billion connected things will be in use 
worldwide in 2017, up 31 percent from 2016, and will reach 20.4 billion by 2020”. Gartner 
noted that the consumer segment “is the largest user of connected things with 5.2 billion units 
in 2017, which represents 63 percent of the overall number of applications in use” (Gartner 
2017).   
Embedding sensing capacity, connectivity and actuation at scale in everyday objects enables 
new ways of organising social and economic activity. At a basic level, it allows individuals to 
better understand their consumer behaviour (e.g. smart energy meters) or to control and 
automate certain aspects of their daily lives (e.g. smart fridges for grocery shopping). In 
addition, it allows businesses to generate more meaningful insights from their customer data, 
	 4	
to better forecast demand and supply (e.g. smart energy grid - smart energy planning) or to 
potentially enable new patterns of ownership and business models to emerge (e.g. connected 
and autonomous vehicles – transport as mobility).  
However, embedding connectivity in everyday objects and, most importantly, at the scale 
reported and projected by current market analysis brings about crucial policy concerns, 
especially with regard to data protection and cybersecurity (OECD 2016, GoScience UK 2015, 
IEEE-SA 2015). These challenges are most evident in the IoT consumer segment, which has 
witnessed most growth in recent years.  
There are at least three reasons why IoT consumer products have a low level of security and 
raise increasing concerns over privacy, security and safety. First, the consumer products 
industry has characteristically operated at low margin, especially with the growth of global 
supply chains. Adding connectivity to traditionally unconnected consumer products is 
perceived as a driver to increase sales and profits in this low margin industry faced with 
increased competition. Thus, manufacturers of IoT consumer products have limited incentives 
to embed cybersecurity specifications in consumer products, which would increase costs while 
also potentially affecting the life and user-friendliness of their products (Brown 2015). Second, 
many of the firms operating in this global supply chain, as well as many of the consumers 
currently purchasing IoT products, have limited experience of valuing cybersecurity in 
everyday products such as toys, lightbulbs, fridges. Subsequently, at present, it is difficult for 
manufacturers, suppliers and consumers to price cybersecurity to the extent that they are 
currently valuing safety in consumer electronics or motor vehicles. Lastly, even if 
manufacturers and sellers of IoT consumer products have an incentive to introduce 
cybersecurity into their products (e.g. for brand reputation), it is difficult and costly for them to 
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push best cybersecurity practices down the entire supply chain and to monitor that they have 
been adopted by each supply tier, including software and hardware providers (Brass et al 2017).  
In this context, IoT compounds the impact of security disincentives in a globally distributed 
consumer product market that is notoriously high clockspeed and low margin. This results in 
the release of products with a relatively low degree of security, as manifested in the use of 
vendor default passwords and lack of interfaces for device owners to update them, as well as 
limited device capability to identify vulnerabilities and perform software updates. Thus, IoT 
products with low security specifications act as a target and source of network abuse, increasing 
the vector surface of compromised devices used for in botnets for Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks.   
The result of these practices is an extreme form of negative spillovers in Internet security: 
insecure products have costly implications for network providers, regulators and policy-makers, 
who have to internalize these costs in their operations (e.g. internet providers who monitor the 
networks for abuse such as botnets) and to construct measures to correct behaviour against them 
(e.g. regulators/ policy-makers who have to ensure that citizens are provided with a responsible 
level of data protection and cybersecurity).  
This paper conducts an analysis of the Mirai distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on 
KrebsonSecurity, OVH and Dyn using compromised IoT endpoint devices (routers, CCTVs 
and TV sets connected to the Internet) in order to investigate the unique cybersecurity risks and 
uncertainties that are emerging from the growth of IoT.  
The paper identifies three unique characteristics of IoT botnets. The first is the higher potential 
utilization rate of permanently switched on, connected things.  The second is that infections are 
more durable given the lack of or limited capacity of these devices to incorporate security 
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features in their hardware as well as control and lifetime vulnerability management in their 
software. Third, IoT devices have a potentially greater contamination rate due to the 
increasingly networked ecosystem in which they operate (e.g. smart homes). The result is a 
malware infrastructure that is more reliable for abusive activities than conventional botnets.   
Having identified the unique characteristics of IoT botnets, the paper explores the potential 
governance mechanisms for managing the risks associated with this technology, focusing on 
three types of interventions: a) mandatory regulation at domestic level; b) voluntary 
standardisation at domestic and international level; c) self-regulation by expert anti-abuse 
communities at international level.  
Rather than arguing in favour of a single type of intervention, the paper proposes an integrated 
and adaptive governance approach that relies on complementarity of interventions and the 
combined capabilities of domestic and transnational actors to tackle the cybersecurity risks 
associated with IoT (Abott and Snidal 2009, Buthe and Mattli 2011, Cafaggi 2012b). Risk 
regulation, whether mandatory or voluntary, has to balance considerations about the degree of 
anticipation/precaution (i.e. minimising the production of risk) and resilience (i.e. mitigating 
the effects of hazards) embedded in intervention packages to tackle the low level of IoT 
cybersecurity. This implies that each of the key dimensions of risk regulation have to be 
satisfied in order to respond to the negative externalities of releasing insecure IoT products into 
the global market: a) information gathering; b) monitoring; c) control; d) correction (Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1] 
The paper concludes that an adaptive governance structure is required to effectively respond to 
the dynamic cybersecurity risks associated with IoT and its potential to develop into a global 
infrastructure of vulnerabilities. This complex adaptive system cannot be based on a single point 
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of control or authority. It requires the identification of key nodes of control and their respective 
resources: a) knowledge/ information; b) human resources; c) financial resources; d) authority 
to modify behaviour. Transnational anti-abuse communities, such as the Message, Malware, 
and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG) and the Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(APWG), play a crucial role in information gathering and monitoring traffic, contributing with 
intelligence to the governance complex for managing the cybersercurity risks of IoT as well as 
facilitating a more modular response to these risks than formal regulations or standards for 
cybersecurity can achieve on their own.   
 
The Mirai Case 
The Mirai botnet, and its unprecedented magnitude, is a recent and well-known instance of 
negative spillovers resulting from a market with limited incentives to design IoT devices with 
adequate security specifications.  
On 30th September 2016, the source code for Mirai was released on HackForum by a user 
called Anna-Senpai. Mirai is a malware designed to search for and compromise Internet-
connected devices that are protected with factory default passwords and usernames, such as 
poorly secured CCTV cameras, TV sets or routers. The approach was to continuously scan the 
IPv4 address space for vulnerable devices, typically against destination ports TCP/23 and 
TCP/2323. It has been reported that “the mean time to compromise a vulnerable IoT device is 
10 minutes or less, which means that compromised devices which are switched off or simply 
rebooted will almost certainly be re-compromised in short order […]” (Dobbins 2016). These 
devices were then used as a platform to launch DDoS attacks on large-
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Dyn and OVH. According to Herzberg et al, Mirai used a “brute force technique for guessing 
passwords a.k.a dictionary attacks based on the following list” (Figure 1): 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Given its continuous scanning capabilities, by which a compromised IoT device starts 
immediate scanning for other devices, Mirai had a floating population of devices located around 
the world. This allowed for the magnitude of the DDoS attacks on Krebs on Security and OVH. 
The attack on Krebs was reported at 620Gbps, while the attack on OVH counts as the Internet’s 
largest DDoS attack at 1Tbps, using over 100,000 devices (Vijayan 2016, Waqas 2016).  
Although Dyn has confirmed that the attack targeted at it had the Mirai botnet as primary source 
of malicious attack traffic, it hasn’t yet confirmed its magnitude or the estimated number and 
location of the compromised devices. It has, however, indicated that observations of the TCP 
attack volume from its datacentres indicated “packet flow bursts 40 to 50 times higher than 
normal”, with some reports estimating an attack magnitude in the 1.2 Tbps range (Hilton 2016). 
If confirmed, the DDoS on Dyn will become the largest in terms of bandwidth size. After the 
release of the Mirai code, the cybersecurity software company Imperva conducted a review of 
recent assaults on its network to identify if any of them carried out Mirai imprints. It found that 
the Mirai botnet was responsible for a rise in GRE floods mitigated by its services in August, 
which peaked at 280 Gbps and 130 Mpps and indicated a powerful botnet. Imperva reported 
that “investigation of the attack uncovered 49,657 unique IPs”, recorded in 164 countries, 
peaking at 280 Gbps and 130 Mpps (Herzberg et al. 2016). Imperva also revealed the 
geolocation of the compromised IoT devices at the time of the investigation (Figure 2).  
[Insert Figure 2] 
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In February 2017, Kaspersky Labs released its Q4 2016 DDoS Intelligence Report, confirming 
that this quarter saw the longer DDoS attack of the year, which lasted for 292 hours (or 12.2 
days), and a record-breaking number of DDoS attacks in one day (1,915 launched on 5th 
November 2016). Kirill Ilganaev, Head of Kaspersky DDoS Protection, predicts that the array 
of devices being harnessed by botnets are increasingly diverse and target more prominent and 
bigger networks:  
“IoT devices have the potential to launch DDoS attacks of any complexity, including 
application layer and encrypted attacks. Given the effectiveness of IoT botnets, as well 
as the growing number of poorly protected IoT devices, we can reasonably predict an 
increase in the number of such attacks as well as their power and complexity. That 
means companies need to take care of their protection in advance, and take a scrupulous 
approach to choosing their DDoS attack filtration service” (Kaspersky Lab, 2017).   
 
The Unique Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of IoT Devices 
The Mirai botnet has unique characteristics with regard to the compromise method, the 
magnitude and the impact of the attack. Regarding the compromise method, the use of IoT 
devices to create botnets is considered much easier and cheaper than compromising PCs. 
Scanning the IP address space for vulnerable devices is much more cost effective than relying 
on a spam service to phish PC users. Given the current and projected growth of IoT, connecting 
and networking more things means increasing the number of entry points to a network and, 
subsequently, increases the likelihood that more connected devices with limited protection will 
be used in future attacks (Global Sign 2017). However, Vijayan noted that increased 
competition for vulnerable devices could also lessen the intensity and scale of Mirai-enabled 
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DDoS attacks, as the same devices could be used to serve a growing number of service denials 
(2016).  
Nonetheless, the simplicity of the compromise method, combined with the magnitude of the 
attack, reveals the unique cybersecurity challenges of IoT. For instance, Verizon’s 2016 Data 
Breach Investigations Report shows that the mean density of a DoS was 5.51Gbps and 
1.89Mpps in 2015 (Figure 3). By contrast, the Mirai botnets reached 280Gbps (Imperva), 
620Gbps (Krebs on Security) and 1Tbps (OVH).  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Taken together, IoT devices have a number of characteristics that increase the strength and 
complexity of DDoS attacks. IoT consumer devices are: 1) are always on, 2) have no antivirus 
support and/or limited update mechanisms, making malware development no more challenging 
than writing another system daemon, 3) do not have fail-safe mechanisms that cut connectivity 
but preserve baseline function (e.g. an IoT refrigerator that can be taken offline but still perform 
the basic chilling functions), and 4) are computationally underpowered, but often have a surfeit 
of raw network interface capacity. Taken together with extraordinarily low barriers to 
penetration - Mirai had a brute force dictionary of approximately 60 uid/gid pairs - IoT abuse 
platforms are comprised of elements that have utilization potential much higher than desktop 
machines, have no performance degradation noticeable to users when infected, and no easy way 
for the average user to remove the infection. 
In short, when leveraged in abuse platforms, IoT botnets have the potential to provide more 
bang for the abusers’ buck. Even worse, unlike visual multitasking environments where user 
interface and performance lag may be an indicator that a malware infection is awry, IoT devices 
may not exhibit performance degradation and may only be reparable through a factory reset 
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users may not know how to perform. Even if users had the incentives to take these mitigation 
efforts, the technical barriers are often higher than applying conventional AV tools.  
Thus, IoT botnets bring new challenges for network providers, regulators and policy-makers. 
The first is the higher potential utilization rate of permanently switched on, connected things.  
The second is that infections are more durable given the lack of or limited capacity of these 
devices to incorporate security features in their hardware as well as control and lifetime 
vulnerability management in their software. Third, IoT devices have a potentially greater 
contamination rate due to the increasingly networked ecosystem in which they operate (e.g. 
smart homes). The result is a malware infrastructure that is more reliable for abusive activities 
than conventional botnets.   
 
Mapping Interventions for IoT Cybersecurity Governance  
The market failure in the global supply chain for IoT products raises questions about the type 
and locus of interventions needed to limit the proliferation and compromise of insecure 
products. Conventional wisdom argues that a market failure of this magnitude requires 
government intervention in the form of mandatory regulatory frameworks, which combine the 
development of a set of minimum security specifications with product certification schemes. 
Given the global nature of the supply chain for IoT products, and in order to limit the negative 
impacts of a potential regulatory race to the bottom, these minimum security specifications 
would also require international harmonisation in standards development organisations (SDOs). 
In the market for consumer electronics, this approach is currently used to certify the safety and 




To date, governments and regulators across the three regions that are estimated to “represent 
67% of the overall IoT installed base in 2017” – Western Europe, North America and East Asia 
– have adopted a ‘light touch’ regulatory approach to securing IoT, issuing a combination of 
non-binding, high level guidelines and sector-specific recommendations (Gartner 2017). In 
other words, governments have to date predominantly utilised their advisory rather than their 
rule-making capacity to promote IoT security.  
This approach has been used in the UK and the US, where government agencies have released 
minimum guidelines for “security by design” and “security by default” for IoT products and 
systems. For instance, in the US, the Department of Homeland Security produced a set of non-
binding Strategic Principles for Securing the IoT, following an end-to-end and lifecycle 
approach to IoT security. The principles indicate that “security by design” (i.e. in the technical 
design of an IoT product or system) needs to be complemented by wider security by default 
strategies, most notably: a) that security updates and vulnerability management should occur 
not only through the product lifecycle but also the business lifecycle (e.g. the durability of 
associated products, the anticipated costs of repair, coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities), 
and b) that risk models should be tailored to a device’s intended use and environments (US 
DoHS 2016).  
This ‘light touch’ regulatory approach, which promotes rather than mandates minimum security 
standards for IoT products, has the benefit of being less intrusive in the product development 
process and the consolidation of the market. However, this approach has limited effectiveness 
at monitoring and ensuring compliance with “secure by design” and “secure by default” 
principles for IoT products as they enter the market.   
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An alternative approach would be state-mandated regulations similar to the safety rules and 
certification schemes widely adopted across the world. This approach is currently discussed in 
the EU, where some EU Member States (e.g. Germany) and the European Commission are 
considering new regulatory instruments – such as a certification and labelling system – to 
encourage manufacturers and importers of IoT products who are interested in accessing the EU 
single market to promote security and to inform consumers about the criticality of their 
products. A proposed approach is the adoption of a traffic light label akin to food and energy 
efficiency labelling. A key benefit of this precautionary approach is the minimisation of the 
proliferation of cybersecurity risk in a given market.  
However, given the supply chain for IoT products, it is likely that this approach is less effective 
at minimising the production of cybersecurity risk at a global scale (Genschel & Werle 1993). 
Recalling Figure 2, Mirai-compromised IoT devices were identified across the world (i.e. IP 
addresses of Mirai-infected devices were identified in 164 countries) and, predominantly, in 
markets that have not yet taken measures to promote a minimum level of device security (e.g. 
Vietnam, Brazil). This raises questions about the effectiveness of state-based mandatory 
regulations for IoT devices in the absence of internationally harmonised standards for minimum 
security specifications.  
Voluntary international standardisation  
The decentralisation of technical control via standards is a well-documented and recognised 
form of establishing and disseminating best practice in the supply chain of consumer products, 
such as electronics (Abbott and Snidal 2001, Buthe and Mattli 2011, Mattli & Buthe 2003).  
However, at present, the standards landscape for IoT security is highly fragmented. On the one 
hand, international industry alliances are producing an increasing number of de facto standards: 
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Online Trust Alliance (OTA), Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), Cloud 
Security Alliance (CSA), GSM Alliance (GSMA), OneM2M. One of the main concerns with 
the emergence of these standards is that they are driven by market dynamics, causing further 
fragmentation of the IoT cybersecurity standards landscape, as alliances compete to promote 
their own technical specifications and principles. In addition, the adoption and implementation 
of de facto standards is difficult to monitor at a global scale and the current lack of consolidation 
can, in fact, undermine the incentives IoT manufacturers have to secure their products.   
Standards development in formal organisations (e.g. ISO/ IEC, ITU) can achieve the 
consolidation of security standards for IoT consumer products, given their consensus decision-
making processes and their formal approval procedures (. By linking these standards to trade 
regimes (e.g. WTO rules on product safety), formal standardisation processes could principally 
achieve the establishment of minimum security specifications for IoT products at a global scale. 
However, at present, no formal standards for IoT security in consumer products have been 
adopted by international standards organisations. Although security standards for certain IoT 
applications have been adopted in ISO/ IEC (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles), one of the main 
limitations of formal international standardisation is that it is a long, resource consuming 
process and the consensus decision-making that is embedded in the work practice of technical 
committees within these organisations has a direct effect on the timely adoption of global 
standards. 
The Role of Transnational Anti-Abuse Communities 
Anti-abuse and network operator communities, such as the Message, Malware, and Mobile 
Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG) and the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) have 
traditionally played a crucial role in identifying and working together to tackle bots, malware, 
spam, viruses, DDoS attacks and other types of online exploitation. Given that they are on the 
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front line of IoT abuse, they hold essential intelligence and monitoring capacity to inform and 
support other control and correction agents (e.g. regulators, governments) on the characteristics 
and scope of compromised IoT products. In addition, anti-abuse and network operator 
communities have played a crucial role in developing and horizontally implementing anti-abuse 
norms.  
In the world of IP reputation, the anti-abuse community comprises the world’s expertise in 
collecting abuse indicators through feedback loops and information sharing, synthesizing those 
indicators into reputation metrics, and effectively binding that reputation through firms’ 
application of those metrics at e-mail and traffic gateways around the globe. The anti-abuse 
community has developed a reputation network that has kept pace with conventional abuse 
networks and an information sharing network that synthesizes diverse reports of abuse into 
actionable reputation information, whose demand is demonstrated every day by its ability to 
protect users from abusive messaging around the world.  
Similarly, when abusive actors moved into hosting, an industry typically outside conventional 
anti-abuse communities, the anti-abuse community recognized these new sources of abuse and 
actively engaged the hosting industry to develop best common practices.  Today, M3AAWG 
has a healthy relationship with the hosting industry, in particular, the Internet Infrastructure 
Coalition (i2Coalition) - an industry group comprised of security conscious hosting providers 
that now contribute to promulgating and developing anti-abuse norms in their community, 
including through network operator fora such as NANOG. 
Given the global character of the internet infrastructure, anti-abuse communities can perform 
two fundamental roles – information gathering and monitoring - that traditional intervention 
mechanisms (e.g. state mandated regulations; voluntary international standardisation) cannot 
fully and effectively achieve given the jurisdictional constraints of regulatory measures, the 
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time constraints of standards development, and their limited capacity to monitor and enforce 
compliance with a minimum set of security specifications in the global supply chain for IoT 
products. Given their high clockspeed response mechanisms, anti-abuse communities can serve 
as a credible source of intelligence on the characteristics and scope of IoT products with low 
security specifications as well as an adaptive mechanism to ensure that security best practices 
are dynamic enough to respond to the complex and changing security risks of the IoT market.   
 
Conclusions  
The Mirai DDoS attack has revealed a market failure in the supply chain for IoT consumer 
products and the global scope of IoT cybersecurity risks. Traditional intervention mechanisms 
for securing IoT, such as state-mandated regulations and voluntary international 
standardisation, have not yet fully developed. Although effective at controlling and correcting 
behaviour, such mechanisms take a long time to develop, to build capacity and to be 
implemented (Abbott and Snidal 2009). In addition, their effectiveness at the global scale can 
be questioned given the high level of jurisdictional and market competition that characterises 
the early development stage of the IoT industry. Thus, whereas state-mandated regulations and 
voluntary international standardisation can be effective precautionary measures, by minimising 
the production of security risks in the long term, they require considerable time and financial 
resources to construct robust regimes with international reach, similar to the current 
international regime on safety in consumer electronics (Abbott and Snidal 2011, Buthe and 
Mattli 2011). Transnational actors such as anti-abuse communities play a crucial role in 
providing the necessary information gathering and monitoring capabilities needed to 
understand the characteristics and scope of compromised IoT devices, to categorise their 
criticality and assess their impact in order to mitigate the negative effects of current security 
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practices in the supply chain for IoT products (Cafaggi 2012a, 2012b). Anti-abuse communities 
play a crucial role in the governance complex for securing IoT by providing the system 
resilience needed to deal with the complex and dynamic development of this market. Thus, 
rather than focusing on a particular type of intervention, tackling global IoT cybersecurity risks 
require an adaptive governance system based on the modularity between risk anticipation (e.g. 
standards, certification schemes) and system resilience (e.g. information gathering, 
monitoring).   
 
Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Dimensions of Regulations for IoT Cybersecurity Governance 
Dimensions of Regulation Types of Intervention Response to Risk 
Information gathering Voluntary self-regulation Resilience 
Monitoring Voluntary self-regulation Resilience 
Control Voluntary self-regulation 
Mandatory regulation 
Anticipation/ Resilience 
Correction Mandatory regulation 
Enforced self-regulation 
Anticipation 
Source: Brass et al (2017) 
Figure 1: Mirai Technique for Password Guessing 
 





Figure 2: Geo-locations of all Mirai-infected devices 
 
Source: Herzberg et al (2016) 
 
Figure 3: Denial-of-Service Attack Bandwidth and Packet Count Levels (n=10,808) 
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